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The general purpose of this study is to measure the effects of var-
ious types of budget changes and evaluate their impact- on the
achievement of economic stability and balanced growth during the
eleven-year period from 1955 through 1965 The basic data and
methods used to estimate the effects of budget changes are the same as
those developed for a recent OECD survey by Bent Hansen, which
gives the institutional background to budgetary action and an analysis
of the nature and effects of fiscal policy for each of seven member
countries : Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States (1).
In 1955 Belgium had reached an economic situation which was
different from most of the other countries in the Hansen study.
France, Sweden and the United Kingdom (and the Netherlands, too)
had virtually eliminated unemployment by the early 1950's, and during
the period 1955-65 their major concern was maintaining a balanced
economy which required, on the one hand, managing domestic demand
within a narrow band of over- employment and the imbalances caused
by an inflationary situation and, on the other, an undesirably high level
of unemployment ; Germany, however, did not reach this stage in its
development until almost the end of the 1950's. The United States
maintained a reasonably high level of employment fairly continuously
after the end of World War II, except for two sharp but short lived
recessions, but after 1955 economic policies allowed unemployment to
become increasingly serious until special measures were taken in 1964-
65 to regain full employment. Italy perhaps most closely resembles
(*) I am Particularly indebted to J.C.R. Dow who directed the OECD study of fiscal
policy and to Bent Hansen with whom I had the pleasure of working for two years completing
it. I am also grateful for the comments of my colleagues at the University of Michigan and
especially for the helpful editorial assistance of Janet Eckstein.
(1) Bent HANSEN, assisted by Wayne W. SNYDER, Fiscal Policy in Seven Countries,
1955-65, Paris : Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1969.
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Belgium as it is the only other country where an inflationary situation
caused by excessive domestic demand was not encountered until the
mId-1960's. Italy, however, presents a special case because its open
unemployment, and considerable underemployment, were both related
to regional differences between the industrialized northern and the more
agricultural southern portions of the country. Thus, Belgium stands
out as a particularly interesting case for which it is especially important
to enquire to what extent budget policies helped or hindered the
achievement of economic stability and balanced growth.
The Hansen study provided three measures to characterize the
overall impact of budget changes : the average annual effect on
domestic demand, the effect on the slope of this trend, and the short-
term dampening effect on potential fluctuations in the actual GNP
growth rate. The study did not attempt to weigh these three factors
together in order to evaluate their combined effect on achieving econo-
mic stability and balanced growth. Partly, this was because there
were no officially recognized criteria of what level of demand would
have been desirable in order for each of the seven countries to maintain
a high and balanced growth of demand and potential output.
This paper supplements the Hansen study for Belgium by providing
more disaggregated data about the relative importance of various types
of budget changes, and by assessing the degree to which their overall
impact enhanced the achievement of a high level of economic stability
and growth during the late 1950's and early 1960's. The latter
requires using estimates of potential output, even though it is recognized
that these are neither unique nor unambiguous, because they require
assumptions about the rate of growth of the labor force and its pro-
ductivity which are influenced by government policies affecting the
distribution of output between consumption and investment In spite
of this limitation they provide a useful point of departure for evaluating
budgetary performance and for discussing other major economic
objectives, e.g., relative price stability and balance of payments equi-
librium. But before presenting these evaluations, it is necessary to
explain briefly the methods used to estimate the effects of budget
changes.
I. The Measurement of Budget Effects (2)
To determine the effect of the budget we must first estimate what
would have occurred if there had been no change in the budget, i.e., if
all expenditures and all revenues had remained constant from one
(2) A more detailed explanation of measurement methods is given in the Appendix.
For a complete description of the methods used, see HANSEN, op. cit., Chapter 1.
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period to the next. The difference between this estimate and the
actual developments can be attributed to budget effects. When
government expenditures and revenues change, the effect occurs in a
several stage process. First, there is the direct impact of the increased
(or decreased) spending occasioned by the initial budget change. The
initial change later induces a series of indirect (multiplier) effects. The
combination of all the direct and indirect effects, or the total effects of
budget changes, are traditionally classified in two types : discretionary
and automatic, built-in stabilizers(3). This distinction is necessary
for a discussion of intelligent budgetary policies because it divorces
those effects which are due to specific new government actions from the
effects which are produced by existing laws and regulations ; the dif-
ference between the two categories, however, is by no means unam-
biguous.
When changes in budget expenditures or revenues are clearly due
to deliberate and explicit measures that are unrelated to previous
legislation or budget authorizations, then it is certainly appropriate to
classify them as discretionary. For example, the dampening effect
caused by the increased revenue derived from a new tax law or that part
due to a change in the tax rate can be called discretionary. While
national accounts data do not break down total tax receipts between
discretionary and automatic, the two parts can be separately estimated.
For Belgium, estimates of the change in tax revenue due to discre-
tionary measures were supplied by the Ministry of Finance. This study
assumes that all changes in expenditures are discretionary. Strictly
speaking this assumption can be justified, because most annual expen-
ditures require new budget autorizations. But the true discretionary
element may be substantially less, because many categories of expen-
ditures can not be varied easily and not all expenditures require new
approval. For example, expenditures for education are often related
to the size and composition of a growing population which is a built-
in-factor setting a minimum annual increase, and payments in agricul-
tural subsidy programs are not always subject to new annual appropria-
tions. Even changes in tax rates are sometimes legislated to occur at
future dates, which makes it ambiguous whether to call their effects
discretionary or automatic when they eventually occur
It is conventional to define as built-in stabilizers the automatic
changes under existing laws of tax receipts and expenditures. In the
(3) In general, the total effects of budget changes on domestic demand should also
include the feed-back or e accelerator effects 9 which account for the impact that budget
changes have on private investment (and in turn the additional household demand that
this affects too) when demand is altered by the initial budget change. As will be explained
later, however, the actual model used assumed that all changes in private investment were
exogenously determined; hence, the measurement of budget effects is limited in this res-
pect as well as by the others described further on.
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absence of new taxes or rates, all changes in tax revenues are automatic
and are caused by variations in private income and expenditures. The
most important automatic changes in expenditures occur in the Social
Security programs : health, pension, and unemployment benefits.
Unfortunately it was not possible to obtain a breakdown of Belgium's
Social Security expenditures and revenues, and so all changes are
counted as automatic, even though discretionary changes were made
nearly every year in both benefit and contribution rates(4).
II. The Effects of Budget Changes in Belgium, 1955-65
Estimates of the effects of annual budget changes, expressed as a
percentage of the previous year's GNP, and a breakdown of the effects
for Central government into discretionary and automatic as well as for
several important categories are given in Table 1. The first and most
important conclusion from these figures is that the total effects for the
entire public sector - general government plus the investment expendi-
tures of public enterprises - contributed an average increase of only
0.5 per cent of GNP annually. Second, the average is fairly typical of
the effects for individual years, altough in a few instances the budget
impact was subtantially larger, sometimes positive and at other times it
exerted a dampening influence. Third, the combined total effects were
not the product of strong positive forces emanating from particular sub-
sectors which were mostly offset by a dampening impact of other sectors,
although, of course, the automatic increase in tax revenue diminished
what would have been a larger overall expansionary effect. It should
be noted that whereas the public sector's budget policies contributed
little to increasing domestic demand and employment, other factors were
more important (e.g., exports and private investment). These help
explain why the average annual increase in GNP was 4 per cent in
Belgium betwen 1955 and 1965 and thus was on a par with the growth
rates for Sweden and the United States, and exceeded the 3 per cent for
the United Kingdom, but is was less than the 5 per cent realized by
France and Germany and the 6 per cent achieved by Italy.
Another important observation is that public enterprise investments
accounted for very little of the total expansionary effects (0.1 per cent
of GNP annually). This was not typical of most of the other European
countries where such expenditures had a substantial impact on domestic
(4) L. MORISSENS in an ongoing project to construct an economic policy model for
Belgium has published an article analysing certain important aspects ofthe functioning
of the Social Security system based on the regulations which existed in July, 1967. Un-
fortunately, these can not be used to distinguish between discretionary and automatic
changes which occurred between 1955 and 1965. See, L. MORISSENS, « Estimations des
fonctions de salaire-cout horaire et des cotisations personnelles de securitd sociale *, Cahiers
Economiques de Bruxelles, No. 38-2e trimestre 1968, pp. 289-301.
TABLE 1
Annual Effects of Budget Changes as a Percentage of GNPt_ 1 , 1955-65
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 Average
TOTAL EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SECTOR .........- 0.9 -0.1 -1.5 2.3 1.3 0.5 -0.7 0.5 2.3 0.0 1.6 0.5
Public enterprise investment ........... .. 0.5 -0.1 -0.5 0.2 --0.1 0.0 0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.1
General government ....................- 1.4 0.0 -1.0 2.1 1.4 0.5 -1.1 0.7 2.1 -0.1 1.0 0.4
Local government ................ ... 0.5 -0.4 -0.5 0.9 0.2 -1.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.1
Social security .....................-. 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.6 0.6 0.1
Central government.................-1.5 0.3 -0.4 0.8 0.5 1.4 -1.4 0.4 1.7 -0.2 0.3 0.2
Discretionary effects............ .- 0.5 0.8 -0.3 0.1 0.7 1.1 -0.5 1.1 2.0 0.4 0.5 0.5
Investment expenditures. . ....... 0.4 0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 -0.2 0.1
Employment (volume). .......... 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.5
Other goods and services. ...... -1.0 0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2 -0.4 0.3 0.7 -0.5 0.0 0.0
Indirect taxes on households ... -0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Direct taxes on households .. 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Automatic effects ...............- 1.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.7 -0.2 0.3 -0.9 -0.7 -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.3
Taxes ....................... ..- 1.0 -0.6 -0.3 0.6 -0.3 0.2 -0.9 -0.8 -0.4 -0.8 -0.4 -0.4
Price and wage changes ....... 0.0 ; 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
Source : OECD, National Accounts, and estimates of discretionary tax change by the Ministry of Finance.
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demand, especially in France and Italy, but even in Sweden and the
United Kingdom their effects alone were as large as the entire public
sector in Belgium.
Consequently, most of the budget effects came from general
government where for particular years the impact varied from a positive
push of over 2 per cent of GNP in two years (1968 and 1963) to a
dampening effect which amounted to 1 per cent or more in three years
(1955, 1957 and 1961). Neither local government not the Social
Security system contributed much to the overall expansion. Both
tended somewhat towards being anti-cyclical, especially the Social
Security system which helped considerably to counteract the 1957-1958
recession and to dampen the excessive expansion during 1964.
The central government produced through its budget changes a
small positive push which contributed an average 0.2 per cent of GNP
annually, the result of a somewhat larger amount of positive discretion-
ary effects (0.5 per cent annually) partially offset by the automatic
dampening effects (-0.3 per cent annually). The small impact of
central government has been attributed to <the hostility... to taxes,
mainly direct taxes, as well as prejudices against increases of public debt
and deficits in the budget, >(5) although balancing the budget was
rarely achieved in practice.
The discretionary effects (i.e., changes in expenditures and in tax
rates) were positive during most of the years. The impact on domestic
demand by changes in the direct investment expenditures of the central
government was practically nil (0.1 per cent annually), although small
deviations from this average occured in individual years. It is worth
noting that their impact was negative during each year of the 1957-58
recession when anti-cyclical considerations required expansionary
policies. It has been suggested elsewhere that Keynesian theories and
their accompanying policy implications designed to counteract fluctua-
tions in employment were slower to be accepted in Belgium than in
some countries(6). Increases in the number of government employees,
including the expansion of the Armed Forces but excluding wage
increments, were the largest single positive factor and added about 0.5
per cent to the growth rate annually. Purchases of other goods and
services were nil on balance, but annual variations did occur. Discre-
tionary changes in taxes of any significance were generally rare and
on average had virtually no effect on the growth rate. Changes in
indirect taxes were more frequent and larger on the average than
(5) See, L. MORISSENS, ( Economic Policy in Belgium, 1949-61 in Economic Policy
in our Time, by E.S. KIRSCHEN and associates, Vol. III, Amsterdam : North-Holland
Publishing Co., 1964 and Chicago : Rand Mc NALLY & Co., 1964, p. 8.
(6) Ibid., p. 4.
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changes in direct taxes, although for the period as a whole their average
effects were not substantially different from those for changes in direct
taxes. Generally, it must be said that tax changes were not used as
an important instrument of stabilization policy during the period.
The automatic effects were of two kinds, which operated in
opposite directions. Because the overall income elasticity of the
Belgian tax system is greater than unity, tax revenue grew faster than
income creating a dampening effect which averaged 0.4 per cent of
GNP annually. Given that unemployment was higher than desirable
throughout the period and that output could have increased more
rapidly than it actually did without creating serious price or balance of
payments problems (with the notable exception of 1964), this
dampening effect was potentially harmful. It was, however, partially
offset by the discretionary effects of the changes in the central
government budget mentioned previously, accompanied by some very
modest expansionary effects of Social Security, local government and
the investments of the public enterprises. The tax system functions
rather well from an anti-cyclical point of view, producing moderately
large dampening effects when expansion is particularly rapid as in years
like 1955 and 1964, and creating a fairly strong positive effect during
the recession years like in 1958 (see Table 1). The other type of
automatic effect arises from the price increases of goods and services,
principally wage and salary increments, which add to the expansionary
effects of changes in government expenditure. In the first instance
these changes do not have a direct effect on domestic demand, but by
adding purchasing power to household incomes, they eventually create
indirect or multiplier effects(7). It is questionable whether to call these
effects automatic or discretionary, because the government can directly
influence some prices and can effect the timing of salary negotiations
with its employees. But incomes policies were not practiced during this
period and prices were generally determined by market factors rather
than the discretionary policy of the government, and for this reason the
effects of price and wage salary increases are included as automatic
effects(8). In any case this category of effects had little impact on
domestic demand until a high level of employment was reached. Then
in 1964 and 1965 rising prices in the central government sector accoun-
ted for 0.2 per cent of the increase in GNP, hardly an important factor
but nevertheless a forewarning of increasing weight that this element
of demand will acquire as the Belgian economy moves to a position
more similar to its neighbors who already for several years have had to
(7) See the Appendix for a more complete discussion.
(8) See, L. MoRISSENS, « Economic Policy in Belgium, 1949-61, * op. cit., for details
about direct price controls used in the period through 1961 and HANSEN, op. cit. for a
general discussion of policies during the 1955-65 period.
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deal with the delicate problem of managing demand within a narrow
band of over-and under-full employment.
III. Evaluating Economic Stability and Balanced Growth
The objectives of economic policy are everywhere numerous, and
the instruments used to achieve them are even more so ; nevertheless,
four goals predominate, although others may temporarily replace some
of them from time to time. These four are of primary concern to all
governments : growth, employment, prices, and balance of payments(9).
Changing budgetary expenditures and tax rates are only some
of the means by which economic policies influence the economy gene-
rally and the level of demand, particularly its composition. Monetary
policies, direct controls, and changes in the institutional framework are
other important categories of instruments at the disposal of governments
in their attempt to achieve an appropriate balance among the desired
objectives. It is not the purpose of the Hansen study or of this article to
evaluate the total complex of all governmentpolicies. Rather the subject
is more limited : given whatever influence other economic policies have
had on the level of domestic demand, what have been the total effects
of budget changes - automatic and discretionary - in helping or hin-
dering the economy in achieving economic stability and growth ?
Two approaches are possible : (1) a detailed examination of the
conjunctural scene for the review period with a comparison and eva-
luation of the effects of budgetary policies as they relate to the desired
objectives, to the extent that these are in fact known (this was generally
the method adopted in the Hansen study) ; or (2) taking an approxima-
tion that there did exist a known path of development which if
consistently followed would have been optimum with respect to the
economic goals desired. The second approach is employed in this
study.
L. Morissens has suggested that << the price inflations which Belgium
experienced from 1944 to 1948 left a very vivid memory in the country
and explain the importance given by every Government to price stabi-
lity (10). Probably the United States most closely resembles Belgium
in this respect where high priority is also given to maintaining relatively
stable prices, and undoubtedly explains why both countries were slow
to take adequate measures to reduce excessive unemployment during
the late 1950's and throughout the early years of the 1960's. Belgium
(9) One study lists eight major conjunctural and structural objectives and four minor
targets; and the same study enumerates no fewer than 65 instruments available to achieve
them. E.S. KIRSCHEN et al.,: Economic Policy in Our Time, Amsterdam : North-Holland
Publishing Company, 1964, pp. 4-15 and 148-149.
(10) L. MORISSENS, < Economic Policy in Belgium, 1949-61, * op. cit., p. 4.
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had no serious balance of payments problems, in spite of a continued
trade deficit, and the overall balance was generally favorable enough so
that between 1955 and 1965 reserves of official gold and foreign
exchange more than doubled(11).
Clearly, the importance of other economic objectives especially
relative price stability and a strong balance of payments position, must
be considered in any evaluation of budget policies, but as a first
approximation Belgian budget performance can be evaluated with an
estimate of potential full employment output. This concept was intro-
duced in President Kennedy's first Economic Report to the Congress
of the United States(12). It was designed to highlight how far actual
performance had fallen short of the full economic potential of the United
States since 1955 and to illustrate why special government policies were
required to achieve a high level of employment. Undeniably the need
for generally more expansive budget policies was real because between
1955 and 1965 the unemployment rate continually exceeded 4 per cent
and suspassed 7 per cent during the 1958 and 1961 recessions. By the
standards of most European countries these rates would be totally
unacceptable, but the United States is relatively more concerned with
rising prices than most European countries, although not as much due
to the need to remain competitive in the international markets as in
response to popular demand : Americans like Belgians apparently abhor
rising prices per se, relative or not(13). Eventually direct tax rates for
individuals and corporations were substantially reduced and laws were
passed which would eliminate most Federal indirect taxes in the United
States. The effects of these discretionary measures during 1964 and
1965 finally helped boost the American economy back to a high
level of employment (i.e., 4 per cent unemployment), but during the
eleven years which had passed (since it had passed) since it had last
operated at an optimum level, the accumulated gap between actual and
potential GNP amounted to nearly 50 per cent of a typical year's poten-
tial full-employment output (measured at constant 1958 prices).
No similar estimates have been officially published for Belgium,
but Professor Lundberg in a recent study of the problems of economic
instability faced by the major countries of Western Europe and the
United States in the post-war period provides the required figures. He
defines potential or full employment output to be the combination of an
unemployment rate of 2 per cent, which he considers to be < the mini-
(11) OECD, Statistics of Balance of Payments and Main Economic Indicators.
(12) Economic Report of the President, U.S. Goverment Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., 1962, p. 52.
(13) Between 1955 and 1965 the average annual incresase in consumer prices was
only 1.8 per cent in both Belgium and the United States as compared with an average of
over 3.5 per cent for the other five countries in the HANSEN study.
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FIGURE 1
Actual and Potential GNP, .1955-65
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mum feasible unemployment rate to be applied uniformly for calcula-
ting the potential or full employment labor forces,> and the long-run
trend of labor productivity(1 4). His estimates for Belgium imply that
both the total labor force and labor productivity increased at roughly
constant rates through 1960 which together provided for an average
increase of somewhat less than 3 per cent annually. Afterwards, the
postwar <baby boom> affected the number of persons entering the
labor market, which together with an increased rate of growth of labor
productivity, caused potential output to increase at a higher rate of
about 4 per cent annually.
Figure 1 compares Professor Lundberg's estimates of potential
output with the actual growth of GNP from 1955 to 1965(atconstant 1958
prices). This presentation helps highlight the fact that a substantial
gap between potential and actual GNP prevailed throughout most of
the eleven year period, and that it was only from 1964 that Belgium
began to face the difficult and delicate problems of maintaining demand
at the right level without causing excessive price increases or balance of
payments deficits that many other European countries had already been
dealing with since the early 1950's.
Part II of this study explained how the total effects of budget changes
for the public sector contributed an average upwards push of 0.5 per
cent of GNP annually. Thus, actual GNP as shown in Figure 1 inclu-
des both discretionary and automatic effects of budget changes. It is
relevant to inquire about the extent of these effects on the achievement
of economic stability and balanced growth. This can be assessed by
constructing a hypothetical series of GNP as it would have developed
without the total effects of annual budget changes by subtracting them
from actual GNP for each year. We will call this hypothetical series
the < pure cycle, > because it attempts to estimate what the GNP would
have been if there had been no change in the budget, i.e., if neither
expenditures nor revenues had changed from one year to the next. The
pure cycle is useful for comparison with both actual and potential GNP
in order to evaluate the degree to which budget policies were a positive
or negative contribution to economic stability and balanced growth.
The pure cycle attempts to eliminate only the effects of budget
changes and still includes the effects of other government policies
(monetary and direct controls) as well as autonomous forces (e.g., pri-
vate investment and exports) allowing for endogenous mechanisms
(e.g., leakages through private savings and imports) (15). Hence the
pure cycle is not so pure, but it is nevertheless a useful analytical tool.
(14) ERIK LUNDBERG, Instability and Economic Growth New Haven : Yale University
Press, 1968, pp. 96-114.
(15) See the Appendix for further details.
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Figure 2 gives actual GNP and the pure cycle expressed as deviations
from potential output, which is shown for convenience as a horizontal
line. The vertical difference between the actual GNP and the pure
cycle is equivalent to the total effects of budget changes as given in
Table 1. The arrows indicate the direction of the total effects and
point from the pure cycle to the actual GNP. Arrows which point
towards potential GNP indicate budget effects which helped achieve
economic stability and balanced growth, and those pointing away indi-
cate years when the effects of budget changes were destabilizing.
In 1955 Belgium was in the second year of recovery from the post-
Korean recession of 1952-53, and unemployment had declined to its
lowest point since the end of World War II, about 3.8 per cent of the
labor force("). Unemployment continued to decline, but it took the
1958-59 recession to convince the government that full-employment
could not be achieved without special measures. These were under-
taken from 1959-61 and included inter alia, the creation of an Econo-
mic Planning Board, a mixed committee to advise on the government
investments as proposed in a 15 year plan of public works, and a variety
of schemes to promote private investments('7 ). Undoubtedly, these
alone are not enough to explain the difference, but from 1959-63 the
average effects of the public sector amounted to 0.8 per cent of GNP
annually as compared with virtually no impact on the average during
the years from 1955 to 1958 (see Tablel).
From 1955 through 1957 the budget impact was destabilizing
and contributed to the external conditions (i.e., the stagnation of export
demand) which created the 1957-58 recession. In 1958 and 1959 the
budget effects helped moderate the recession ; in the former year mostly
due to the automatic anticyclical functioning of the tax system, and in
the latter year due to increased central government expenditures,
including substantially higher Social Security benefits unmatched by new
contribution rates. For the next years, 1960-62, in spite of explicit
plans to attack unemployment, the net impact hardly affected closing
the gap between potential and actual GNP, but in 1963 larger govern-
ment expenditures across a wide front of activities brought the economy
closer to full employment than it had ever before been. In
1964 there was even some excess demand which led the government
to declare its intention to deflate some, but the net impact was positive
in 1965, and Belgium had definitely entered a new era : how to main-
(16) Manpower Statistics, 1954-64, Paris : Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, 1965, p. 59.
(17) See, L. MORISSENS, « Economic Policy in Belgium, 1949-61, ((op. cit., pp. 46-47
and passim for a discussion of these special measures.
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FIGURE 2
Deviations of Actual GNP and the Pure Cycle from Potential Output
% Deviation from Potential Output
-2
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tain full employment without creating excess demand and economic
instability.
A summary of the effects of the budget changes for the entire
eleven-year period is given in Table 2. From Figure 2 it is not self-
evident that the budget impact was either stabilizing or destabilizing
with respect to helping achieve potential output over the period as a
whole. The pure cycle remained below potential output during all but
one year during the period from 1955 through 1965. The total
divergence of the pure cycle below potential output amounted to about
40 per cent of a typical year's potential output. The sum of the
stabilizing effects amounted to only 7.4 per cent, and of this 3.6 per cent
were offset by destabilizing effects. Hence, the net stabilizing effects
were reduced to a mere 3.8 per cent, or less than 10 per cent of the
potential amount of stabilization that would have been required if
Belgium had managed to maintain GNP at exactly full employment
throughout the period 1955-65.
TABLE 2
Total Effects and Economic Stabilization, 1955-65
(expressed as a percentage of potential GNP)
Per Cent
1. Total (absolute) divergence between pure cycle and
potential G N P ............................................. 39.9
a. Above potential ....................................... 1.0
b. Below potential ....................................... 38.9
2. Sum of stabilizing effects................................. 7.4
a. Above potential ....................................... 0.0
b. Below potential ....................................... 7.4
3. Sum of destabilizing effects.............................. 3.6
a. Above potential ....................................... 0.7
b. Below potential ....................................... 2.9
4. Net stabilizing effects (2 minus 3)................... 3.8
a. Above potential...................................0.7(a)
b. Below potential ....................................... 4.5
5. Total divergence between actual and potential GNP
(1 m inus 4)................................................... 36.1
a. Above potential ....................................... 1.7
b. Below potential ....................................... 34.4
6. Net stabilization achieved (4 : 1)...................... 9.5
(a) Minus indicates destabilizing effects.
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Calculated on a similar basis, the amount of stabilization in France
was 29 per cent, Italy 21 per cent, the United Kingdom 29 per cent.
the United States 17 per cent, and Sweden a remarkable 64 per cent.
Thus, the economic stabilizing effects of Belgian budget policies was
definitely less than for any of the other six countries included in the
Hansen study.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
The general conclusion must be that on average the net impact of
budget changes was a positive factor in achieving economic stability and
balanced growth, but the amount of stabilization achieved was very
small in relation to the potential necessary. It must be noted, however,
that the amount of net stabilization achieved after the 1957-58 reces-
sion was considerably larger than before, but other qualifications are
necessary too.
The concept of potential output based on a constant 2 per cent
rate of unemployment ignores the particular constellation of conjunctu-
ral objectives being simultaneously sought at any particulartime, and the
2 per cent rate may itself be questioned as not being compatible with
relative price stability and an adequate balance of payments position.
Although the period of serious inflation (before 1964) occurred during
the Korean boom of 1950-51, caused by both excessive domestic
demand relative to the then existing actual output and by the increasing
cost of imports, all Belgian governments have given high priority to
maintaining stable prices. Exports are nearly half as large as GNP
itself and any deterioration of their international competitiveness would
seriously affect exports and imports as well. Thus, giving a high
priority to price stability relative to employment must be assessed with
this in mind. Nevertheless, greater efforts to achieve Belgium's full
potential output could have been undertaken earlier without creating
inflationary pressures.
The purpose of this article has been to measure economic stabili-
zation, not to explain why a greater amount was not achieved, but two
factors are crucial in understanding why full employment policies were
not adopted sooner. First, as one author has said <up to 1958, the
governments were mainly preoccupied with non-economic problems
(18) >. Second, there are institutional restraints built into the budget
process which seriously limit using the budget as a major tool of econo-
mic policy(19). What remains clear is that by 1964 Belgium had
(18) L. MORRISSENS : op. cit., p. 3 and passim.
(19) For a discussion of the institutional framework within which budget policies are
formulated and executed, see HANSEN, Op. cit., pp. 124-138.
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successfully put behind its long history of undesirably high unemploy-
ment and had entered a new phase of its economic growth. The need
for flexible budget policies is even greater now that a high level of
employment prevails. In order to achieve a satisfactory combination
of economic stability and balanced growth, in the future the budget
must be capable of being subjected to the fine tuning required to
maintain the economy within the narrow band of overfull and full




The basic methods used to estimate the impact of budget
changes can be illustrated by reference to a very simple Keynesian
model, where Y is GNP, I is private investment, C is private con-
sumption, G is government purchases of goods and services, T is
tax revenue, a is the marginal propensity to consume out of dispo-
sable income and t is the marginal tax rate
Y= I x C+ G
(1) C = x(Y - T)
T = tY
Changes in Y can be expressed by differentiating (1) which gives
two equally good 4 reduced form >>equations, where d indicates
change (i.e., Ydt = change in tax revenue due to a discretionary
change in the tax rate)
1
(2) dY = (dI+ dG - a Ydt)
1 - a (1 - t)
1
or (3) dY = (dI + dG -- adT)
1 - a
Either (2) or (3) is equally good for explaining changes in Y, but (3)
requires knowing only the amount of total change in taxes (dT)
while (2) requires knowing the amount of discretionary change in
taxes (Ydt).
The discretionary effects of budget changes, Ediscr., are defined
as the difference between the actual change in Y and the change
which would have occurred if there had been no discretionary
change in the budget from one year to the next (i.e., if dG and Ydt
are both equal to zero), but allowing for leakages into private savings
and automatic tax changes; then from (2)
1
(4) Ediscr. = dY - dI
1-1 - t)
1
(dG -- a Ydt)
1 - (1- t)
The total effects of budget changes, Etotai, are defined as the
difference between the actual change in Y and the change which
would have occurred if no budget change at all had occurred, which
means that the marginal rate of taxes would have to be zero as in (3) :
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An explicit expression for the automatic effects of budget
changes, Eauto., can be derived, but as the total effects of budget
changes are the sum of both automatic and discretionary changes,
it is easier to define them simply as the difference between the total
and the discretionary effects :
(6) Eauto. = Etotai - Ediscr.
The definitions and methods actually employed to estimate the
impact of budget changes are based on the previous contributions
of Brown, Hansen, Lindbeck, and Musgrave (1). Compared with
the large econometric models which have been developed for some
countries, the one in the Hansen study is admittedly primitive,
partly because of the desire to use a common analysis for each of
the seven countries. For the same reason year-to-year changes
are used and no lags are introduced (2). The model assumes that
private investment, exports, and prices (except those caused by
discretionary changes in indirect tax rates) are exogenously deter-
mined. Imports are endogenous and for some countries represent
the principal leakage of the potential budget effects. Government
expenditures distinguish between volume and price changes, the
latter necessitated by the differentiation of direct from indirect
taxes.
The two reduced form equations, comparable to those of the
simple Keynesian model above, for estimating the budget effects
are
+ (dgd + dl)
1
(7) Etotai =+1 + (dgpg + idw) [a (1 -t)]
1-o (1-v) - dTi(1- )
- dTd a (1 -
(1) E. CARY BROWN, « Fiscal Policy in the Thirties : A Reappraisal. * American Eco-
nomic Review 46 (December 1956) : 857-79; Bent HANSEN, « Statsbudgetens verkningar,
Ekonomisk Tidskrift (1959 : 3); Assar LINDBECK, e Statsbudgetens verningar pa konjunk-
turuveckliagen, SOU (1956 : 48); and RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, 4<On Measuring Fiscal
Performance, Review of Economics and Statistics 66 (May 1964) 213-20.
(2) A review of several big models suggests that 3/4 or more of the budget effects
generally occur during the first year, so the absence of explicit lags is not critical; see
HANSEN, op. cit., pp. 20-22, for a detailed discussion of this subject.
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1 + (dgd+dl)(1+Ti)
(8) Ediscr. = - cdt; (1 - Nt)
1 + ti - X (1 - () (1- td) - ydtd a (1 - I)
Equation (7) estimates the total effects of budget changes, speci-
fically allowing for the following factors
(a) Changes in the volume of government purchases of goods (dgd)
and services (dl) are distinguished from their respective
price changes (dgPg + 1 dw).
(b) Only domestic purchases are included; direct government
expenditures abroad were an important component of annual
changes for some countries during the period studied (mili-
tary payments in particular) and are excluded because they
do not affect domestic demand.
(c) Changes in indirect taxes on households (dTi).
(d) Changes in direct taxes on households (dTd).
(e) Leakages via the marginal propensity to consume (x) and via
the marginal propensity to import (v). The model contains
no explicit corporate business ector; consequently a mea-
sures the ratio between changes in personal consumption
and changes in total private income minus only direct taxes
on households. This implies an assumption of a constant
relationship of gross corporate profits to income which is
unaffected by changes in corporate income taxes.
(f) The weighting allows for changes in domestic expenditures
(dgd + dl) to have their full multiplier effects (i.e., direct
plus indirect), while the other items have only indirect or
second-round-and-after effects (e.g., increased wages to
government employees or reduced household taxes both
raise private income, some of which is saved and only after-
wards begins to effect domestic demand).
Equation (8) estimates the discretionary effects of budget
changes, specifically allowing for the following factors
(a) Changes in the volume of government domestic purchases
of goods and services (dgd + dl).
(b) Discretionary changes in the value of indirect taxes on hou-
seholds (cdt1 ).
(c) Discretionary changes in the value of direct taxes on hou-
seholds (ydtd).
(d) Marginal rate of indirect (di) and direct (td) taxes on hou-
seholds.
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The above suggest several important implications :
(a) All changes in the volume of government domestic purchases
are counted as discretionary, whereas in reality some expen-
ditures are tied to legislated norms and programs (e.g.,
education standards in some countries).
(b) All budget effects from changes in prices and salary rates
paid by the government are considered to be automatic,
although governments do have varying degrees of control
over some prices (e.g., goods and services produced by public
enterprises, and commodity price support programs) and
when and by how much government wages are increased.
(c) Neither tax changes nor price and wage changes are deflated.
This is because the model assumed that prices, before indi-
rect taxes, are exogenously determined and are only in-
fluenced by discretionary changes in direct taxes. Other
authors sometimes deflated both (3), but to do so would have
introduced an inconsistency between equations (7) and (8),
given the model's assumption about price determination.
(d) The weighting system implies that a unit of discretionary
change in government purchases will have a greater effect
than a unit change in taxes, and among the latter the discre-
tionary effects of a unit change in indirect taxes has a larger
effect than a similar change in direct taxes. These results
are well known from the literature about the (balanced
budget multiplier )>and are generally consistent with the
implicit multipliers of the 4 big models. a
A NOTE ON THE STATISTICAL METHODS : Most data were derived
from adjustments to the national accounts statistics published by the
OECD (4). Individual countries furnished supplementary infor-
mation on government imports and the estimated amount of discre-
tionary changes in direct (ydtd) and indirect (cdti) taxes on hou-
seholds (i.e., the difference between the actual and what would have
occurred in the absence of any change in the tax rates). The esti-
mates of the budget effects obtained from equations (7) and (8) are
expressed in terms of the previous year's prices. In order to com-
pare the effects of one year with another, they were normalized by
expressing them as a percentage of the previous year's GNP. The
estimates of the various budget effects given in Table 1 were obtained
in this manner. For the data used in Figure 2, however, it was
necessary to use the appropriate GNP deflators in order to express
all the budget effects in constant 1958 prices.
(3) E. CARY BROWN, Op. cit.
(4) For methods and definitions see A Standard System of National Accounts, Paris :
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1964.
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Equations (7) and (8) used to estimate total and discretionary
effects of budget changes imply multipliers which depend on various
leakage coefficients; these are given in Table A-1. The marginal
rates of taxation refer to general government not central government
alone. If the consumption coefficient seems small, it must be re-
membered that a is the ratio between changes in personal consump-
tion and changes in total private income minus only direct taxes.
Using this definition, Belgium's marginal propensity to consume
(75 per cent) is average among the seven countries where similar
coefficients varied from 70 to 80 per cent. Belgium's marginal rate
of direct taxes on households was 10 per cent which was slightly
higher than France and Italy (5) where the rate was only 8 per cent,
but considerably lowert han Sweden where the marginal rate aver-
aged 30 per cent between 1955 and 1965. The marginal rate of in-
direct taxes was about 15 per cent which was similar to rates which
prevailed in both Germany and Italy, somewhat higher than in Sweden,
the United Kingdom and the United States where it averaged
Table A-1
Leakage Coefficients and Multipliers
Leakage Coefficients
Marginal rate of direct taxes on households (td) 0.10
Marginal rate of indirect taxes on households (ti) 0.15
Marginal rate of consumption (a) . . . . . . . . 0.75
Marginal rate of imports (.,) . . . . . . . . . 0.50
Multipliers for discretionary effects
Changes in the volume of government domestic
purchases (dgd + d1). ... . . ..... 1.42
Changes in rates of direct taxes on households (ydtd) . . 0.46
Changes in rates of indirect taxes on households (cdti). . 0.62
Multipliers for total effects
Changes in the volume of government domestic purchases
(dgd + dl)...... .. . ...... 1.60
Changes in the value of government domestic purchases due
to wage-price changes (gdpg + 1 dw) and changes in
total direct taxes on households (dTd)....... .. 0.60
Changes in total indirect taxes on households (dTi) . . 0.80
Source : HANSEN, Op. cit., pp. 31-32.
(5) For Italy the marginal direct tax rate includes corporations as well as households
and is not strictly comparable with rates for other countries which refer to household
taxes only.
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approximately 10 per cent, but less than France's 21 per cent. The
multipliers for Belgium (along with those for Sweden) are the lowest
among the seven countries. This is essentially because the mar-
ginal propensity to import (50 per cent) is the highest recorded
among these countries, and the size of the multiplier is more sensi-
tive to the factor than to differences in ther other leakage coeffi-
cients at least over the ranges involved. This means that, ceteris
paribus, a unit change in the budget in Belgium has a smaller effect
on domestic demand than elsewhere.
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